Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817

Homi K. Bhabha


Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0093-1896%281985%2912%3A1%3C144%3ASTFWQO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

*Critical Inquiry* is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
A remarkable peculiarity is that they (the English) always write the personal pronoun I with a capital letter. May we not consider this Great I as an unintended proof how much an Englishman thinks of his own consequence?

—ROBERT SOUTHEY, *Letters from England*

There is a scene in the cultural writings of English colonialism which repeats so insistently after the early nineteenth century—and, through that repetition, so triumphantly *inaugurates* a literature of empire—that I am bound to repeat it once more. It is the scenario, played out in the wild and wordless wastes of colonial India, Africa, the Caribbean, of the sudden, fortuitous discovery of the English book. It is, like all myths of origin, memorable for its balance between epiphany and enunciation. The discovery of the book is, at once, a moment of originality and authority, as well as a process of displacement that, paradoxically, makes the presence of the book wondrous to the extent to which it is repeated, translated, misread, displaced. It is with the emblem of the English book—"signs taken for wonders"—as an insignia of colonial authority and a signifier of colonial desire and discipline, that I want to begin this essay.

I would like to thank Stephan Feuchtwang for his sustaining advice, Gayatri Spivak for suggesting that I should further develop my concept of colonial mimicry; Parveen Adams for her impeccable critique of the text; and Jacqueline Bhabha, whose political engagement with the discriminatory nature of British immigration and nationality law has convinced me of the modesty of the theoretical enterprise.
In the first week of May 1817, Anund Messeh, one of the earliest Indian catechists, made a hurried and excited journey from his mission in Meerut to a grove of trees just outside Delhi.

He found about 500 people, men, women and children, seated under the shade of the trees, and employed, as had been related to him, in reading and conversation. He went up to an elderly looking man, and accosted him, and the following conversation passed.

'Pray who are all these people? and whence come they?' 'We are poor and lowly, and we read and love this book.' — 'What is that book?' 'The book of God!' — 'Let me look at it, if you please.' Anund, on opening the book, perceived it to be the Gospel of our Lord, translated into the Hindoostanee Tongue, many copies of which seemed to be in the possession of the party: some were PRINTED, others WRITTEN by themselves from the printed ones. Anund pointed to the name of Jesus, and asked, 'Who is that?' 'That is God! He gave us this book.' — 'Where did you obtain it?' 'An Angel from heaven gave it us, at Hurdwar fair.' — 'An Angel?' 'Yes, to us he was God’s Angel: but he was a man, a learned Pundit.' (Doubtless these translated Gospels must have been the books distributed, five or six years ago, at Hurdwar by the Missionary.) 'The written copies we write ourselves, having no other means of obtaining more of this blessed word.' — 'These books,' said Anund, 'teach the religion of the European Sahibs. It is THEIR book; and they printed it in our language, for our use.' 'Ah! no,' replied the stranger, 'that cannot be, for they eat flesh.' — 'Jesus Christ,' said Anund, 'teaches that it does not signify what a man eats or drinks. EATING is nothing before God. Not that which entereth into a man’s mouth defileth him, but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man: for vile things come forth from the heart. Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts; and these are the things that defile.'

'That is true; but how can it be the European Book, when we believe that it is God’s gift to us? He sent it to us at Hurdwar.' 'God gave it long ago to the Sahibs, and THEY sent it to us.’ . . . The ignorance and simplicity of many are very striking, never having heard of a printed book before; and its very appearance was to them miraculous. A great stir was excited by the gradual increasing information hereby obtained, and all united to acknowledge the superiority of the doctrines of this Holy Book to every thing which

Homi K. Bhabha is lecturer in English literature and literary theory at the University of Sussex. He is working at present on Power and Spectacle: Colonial Discourse and the English Novel and is commissioning and editing a collection of essays entitled Nation and Narration: Post-structuralism and the Culture of National Identity. He is also writing the introduction to the new English edition of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks.
they had hitherto heard or known. An indifference to the distinctions of Caste soon manifested itself; and the interference and tyrannical authority of the Brahmins became more offensive and contemptible. At last, it was determined to separate themselves from the rest of their Hindoo Brethren; and to establish a party of their own choosing, four or five, who could read the best, to be the public teachers from this newly-acquired Book. . . . Anund asked them, ‘Why are you all dressed in white?’ ‘The people of God should wear white raiment,’ was the reply, ‘as a sign that they are clean, and rid of their sins.’ — Anund observed, ‘You ought to be BAPTIZED, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Come to Meerut: there is a Christian Padre there; and he will shew you what you ought to do.’ They answered, ‘Now we must go home to the harvest; but, as we mean to meet once a year, perhaps the next year we may come to Meerut.’ . . . I explained to them the nature of the Sacrament and of Baptism; in answer to which, they replied, ‘We are willing to be baptized, but we will never take the Sacrament. To all the other customs of Christians we are willing to conform, but not to the Sacrament, because the Europeans eat cow’s flesh, and this will never do for us.’ To this I answered, ‘This WORD is of God, and not of men; and when HE makes your hearts to understand, then you will PROPERLY comprehend it.’ They replied, ‘If all our country will receive this Sacrament, then will we.’ I then observed, ‘The time is at hand, when all the countries will receive this WORD!’ They replied, ‘True!’

Almost a hundred years later, in 1902, Joseph Conrad’s Marlow, traveling in the Congo, in the night of the first ages, without a sign and no memories, cut off from the comprehension of his surroundings, desperately in need of a deliberate belief, comes upon Towson’s (or Towser’s) Inquiry into some Points of Seamanship.

Not a very enthralling book; but at the first glance you could see there a singleness of intention, an honest concern for the right way of going to work, which made these humble pages, thought out so many years ago, luminous with another than a professional light. . . . I assure you to leave off reading was like tearing myself away from the shelter of an old and solid friendship. . . .

“It must be this miserable trader—this intruder,” exclaimed the manager, looking back malevolently at the place we had left. “He must be English,” I said.9

Half a century later, a young Trinidadian discovers that same volume of Towson’s in that very passage from Conrad and draws from it a vision of literature and a lesson of history. “The scene,” writes V. S. Naipaul, answered some of the political panic I was beginning to feel.

To be a colonial was to know a kind of security; it was to inhabit a fixed world. And I suppose that in my fantasy I had seen myself
coming to England as to some purely literary region, where, untrammeled by the accidents of history or background, I could make a romantic career for myself as a writer. But in the new world I felt that ground move below me. . . . Conrad . . . had been everywhere before me. Not as a man with a cause, but a man offering . . . a vision of the world's half-made societies . . . where always "something inherent in the necessities of successful action . . . carried with it the moral degradation of the idea." Dismal but deeply felt: a kind of truth and half a consolation.  

Written as they are in the name of the father and the author, these texts of the civilizing mission immediately suggest the triumph of the colonialisit moment in early English Evangelism and modern English literature. The discovery of the book installs the sign of appropriate representation: the word of God, truth, art creates the conditions for a beginning, a practice of history and narrative. But the institution of the Word in the wilds is also an Entstellung, a process of displacement, distortion, dislocation, repetition—the dazzling light of literature sheds only areas of darkness. Still the idea of the English book is presented as universally adequate: like the "metaphoric writing of the West," it communicates "the immediate vision of the thing, freed from the discourse that accompanied it, or even encumbered it."  

Shortly before the discovery of the book, Marlow interrogates the odd, inappropriate, "colonial" transformation of a textile into an uncertain textual sign, possibly a fetish:

Why? Where did he get it? Was it a badge—an ornament—a charm—a propitiatory act? Was there any idea at all connected with it? It looked startling round his black neck, this bit of white thread from beyond the seas.  

Such questions of the historical act of enunciation, which carry a political intent, are lost, a few pages later, in the myth of origins and discovery. The immediate vision of the book figures those ideological correlatives of the Western sign—empiricism, idealism, mimeticism, monoculturalism (to use Edward Said's term)—that sustain a tradition of English "national" authority. It is, significantly, a normalizing myth whose organics and revisionary narrative is also the history of that nationalist discipline of Commonwealth history and its equally expansionist epigone, Commonwealth literature. Their versions of traditional, academicist wisdom moralize the conflictual moment of colonialist intervention into that constitutive chain of exemplum and imitation, what Friedrich Nietzsche describes as the monumental history beloved of "gifted egoists and visionary scoundrels." For despite first appearances, a repetition of the episodes of the book reveals that they represent important moments in the historical transformation and discursive transfiguration of the colonial text and context.
Anund Messeh’s riposte to the natives who refuse the sacrament—“the time is at hand when all countries will receive this word”—is both firmly and timely spoken in 1817. For it represents a shift away from the “orientalist” educational practice of, say, Warren Hastings and the much more interventionist and “interpellative” ambition of Charles Grant for a culturally and linguistically homogeneous English India. It was with Grant’s election to the board of the East India Company in 1794 and to Parliament in 1802, and through his energetic espousal of the Evangelical ideals of the Clapham sect, that the East India Company reintroduced a “pious clause” into its charter for 1813. By 1817 the Church Missionary Society ran sixty-one schools, and in 1818 it commissioned the Burdwan Plan, a central plan of education for instruction in the English language. The aim of the plan anticipates, almost to the word, Thomas Macaulay’s infamous 1835 “Minute on Education”: “to form a body of well instructed labourers, competent in their proficiency in English to act as Teachers, Translators, and Compilers of useful works for the masses of the people.” Anund Messeh’s lifeless repetition of chapter and verse, his artless technique of translation, participate in one of the most artful technologies of colonial power. In the same month that Anund Messeh discovered the miraculous effects of the book outside Delhi—May 1817—a correspondent of the Church Missionary Society wrote to London describing the method of English education at Father John’s mission in Tranquebar:

The principal method of teaching them the English language would be by giving them English phrases and sentences, with a translation for them to commit to memory. These sentences might be so arranged as to teach them whatever sentiments the instructor should choose. They would become, in short, attached to the Mission; and though first put into the school from worldly motives alone, should any of them be converted, accustomed as they are to the language, manners and climate of the country, they might soon be prepared for a great usefulness in the cause of religion. . . . In this way the Heathens themselves might be made the instruments of pulling down their own religion, and of erecting in its ruins the standards of the Cross. [MR, May 1817, p. 187]

Marlow’s ruminative closing statement, “He must be English,” acknowledges at the heart of darkness, in Conrad’s fin de siècle malaise which Ian Watt so thoroughly describes, the particular debt that both Marlow and Conrad owe to the ideals of English “liberty” and its liberal-conservative culture. Caught as he is—between the madness of “prehistoric” Africa and the unconscious desire to repeat the traumatic intervention of modern colonialism within the compass of a seaman’s yarn—Towson’s manual provides Marlow with a singleness of intention. It is the book of work that turns delirium into the discourse of civil address.
For the ethic of work, as Conrad was to exemplify in “Tradition” (1918), provides a sense of right conduct and honour achievable only through the acceptance of those “customary” norms which are the signs of culturally cohesive “civil” communities. These aims of the civilizing mission, endorsed in the “idea” of British imperialism and enacted on the red sections of the map, speak with a peculiarly English authority based upon the customary practice on which both English common law and the English national language rely for their effectivity and appeal. It is the ideal of English civil discourse that permits Conrad to entertain the ideological ambivalences that riddle his narratives. It is under its watchful eye that he allows the fraught text of late nineteenth-century imperialism to implode within the practices of early modernism. The devastating effects of such an encounter are not only contained in an (un)common yarn; they are concealed in the propriety of a civil “lie” told to the Intended (the complicity of the customary?): “The horror! The horror!” must not be repeated in the drawing-rooms of Europe.

It is to preserve the peculiar sensibility of what he understands as a tradition of civility that Naipaul “translates” Conrad, from Africa to the Caribbean, in order to transform the despair of postcolonial history into an appeal for the autonomy of art. The more fiercely he believes that “the wisdom of the heart has no concern with the erection or demolition of theories,” the more convinced he becomes of the unmediated nature of the Western book—“the words it pronounces have the value of acts of integrity.” The values that such a perspective generates for his own work, and for the once colonized world it chooses to represent and evaluate, are visible in the hideous panorama that some of his titles provide: The Loss of El Dorado, The Mimic Men, An Area of Darkness, A Wounded Civilization, The Overcrowded Barracoon.

The discovery of the English book establishes both a measure of mimesis and a mode of civil authority and order. If these scenes, as I’ve narrated them, suggest the triumph of the writ of colonialist power, then it must be conceded that the wily letter of the law inscribes a much more ambivalent text of authority. For it is in between the edict of Englishness and the assault of the dark unruly spaces of the earth, through an act of repetition, that the colonial text emerges uncertainly. Anund Messeh disavows the natives’ disturbing questions as he returns to repeat the now questionable “authority” of Evangelical dicta; Marlow turns away from the African jungle to recognize, in retrospect, the peculiarly “English” quality of the discovery of the book; Naipaul turns his back on the hybrid half-made colonial world to fix his eye on the universal domain of English literature. What we witness is neither an untroubled, innocent dream of England nor a “secondary revision” of the nightmare of India, Africa, the Caribbean. What is “English” in these discourses of colonial power cannot be represented as a plenitude or a “full” presence; it is determined by its belatedness. As a signifier of authority, the English book acquires
its meaning after the traumatic scenario of colonial difference, cultural or racial, returns the eye of power to some prior, archaic image or identity. Paradoxically, however, such an image can neither be “original”—by virtue of the act of repetition that constructs it—nor “identical”—by virtue of the difference that defines it. Consequently, the colonial presence is always ambivalent, split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation as repetition and difference.

It is this ambivalence that makes the boundaries of colonial “positionality”—the division of self/other—and the question of colonial power—the differentiation of colonizer/colonized—different from both the Hegelian master/slave dialectic or the phenomenological projection of Otherness. It is a différence produced within the act of enunciation as a specifically colonial articulation of those two disproportionate sites of colonial discourse and power: the colonial scene as the invention of historicity, mastery, mimesis or as the “other scene” of Entstellung, displacement, fantasy, psychic defence, and an “open” textuality. Such a display of difference produces a mode of authority that is agonistic (rather than antagonistic). Its discriminatory effects are visible in those split subjects of the racist stereotype—the simian Negro, the effeminate Asiatic male—which ambivalently fix identity as the fantasy of difference. To recognize the différence of the colonial presence is to realize that the colonial text occupies that space of double inscription, hallowed—no, hollowed—by Jacques Derrida:

whenever any writing both marks and goes back over its mark with an undecidable stroke . . . [this] double mark escapes the pertinence or authority of truth: it does not overturn it but rather inscribes it within its play as one of its functions or parts. This displacement does not take place, has not taken place once as an event. It does not occupy a simple place. It does not take place in writing. This dis-location (is what) writes/is written. [D, p. 193]

How can the question of authority, the power and presence of the English, be posed in the interstices of a double inscription? I have no wish to replace an idealist myth—the metaphoric English book—with a historicist one—the colonialist project of English civility. Such a reductive reading would deny what is obvious, that the representation of colonial authority depends less on a universal symbol of English identity than on its productivity as a sign of difference. Yet in my use of “English” there is a “transparency” of reference that registers a certain obvious presence: the Bible translated into Hindi, propagated by Dutch or native catechists, is still the English book; a Polish émigré, deeply influenced by Gustave Flaubert, writing about Africa, produces an English classic. What is there about such a process of visibility and recognition that never fails to be an authoritative acknowledgement without ceasing to be a “spacing between
desire and fulfillment, between perpetuation and its recollection . . . [a] medium [which] has nothing to do with a center” (D, p. 212)?

This question demands a departure from Derrida's objectives in “The Double Session”; a turning away from the vicissitudes of interpretation in the mimetic act of reading to the question of the effects of power, the inscription of strategies of individuation and domination in those “dividing practices” which construct the colonial space—a departure from Derrida which is also a return to those moments in his essay when he acknowledges the problematic of “presence” as a certain quality of discursive transparency which he describes as “the production of mere reality-effects” or “the effect of content” or as the problematic relation between the “medium of writing and the determination of each textual unit.” In the rich ruses and rebukes with which he shows up the “false appearance of the present,” Derrida fails to decipher the specific and determinate system of address (not referent) that is signified by the “effect of content” (see D, pp. 173–85). It is precisely such a strategy of address—the immediate presence of the English—that engages the questions of authority that I want to raise. When the ocular metaphors of presence refer to the process by which content is fixed as an “effect of the present,” we encounter not plenitude but the structured gaze of power whose objective is authority, whose “subjects” are historical.

The reality effect constructs a mode of address in which a complementarity of meaning—not a correspondential notion of truth, as antirealists insist—produces the moment of discursive transparency. It is the moment when, “under the false appearance of the present,” the semantic seems to prevail over the syntactic, the signified over the signifier. Contrary to current avant-garde orthodoxy, however, the transparent is neither simply the triumph of the “imaginary” capture of the subject in realist narrative nor the ultimate interpellation of the individual by ideology. It is not a proposal that you cannot positively refuse. It is better described, I suggest, as a form of the disposal of those discursive signs of presence the present within the strategies that articulate the range of meanings from “dispose to disposition.” Transparency is the action of the distribution and arrangement of differential spaces, positions, knowledges in relation to each other, relative to a differential, not inherent, sense of order. This effects a regulation of spaces and places that is authoritatively assigned; it puts the addressee into the proper frame or condition for some action or result. Such a mode of governance addresses itself to a form of conduct that is achieved through a reality effect that equivocates between the sense of disposal, as the bestowal of a frame of reference, and disposition, as mental inclination, a frame of mind. Such equivocation allows neither an equivalence of the two sites of disposal nor their division as self/other, subject/object. Transparency achieves an effect of authority in the present (and an authoritative presence) through a process similar to what Michel Foucault describes as “an effect of finalisation, relative to an objective,”
without its necessary attribution to a subject that makes a prohibitory law, thou shalt or thou shalt not.\textsuperscript{14}

The place of difference and otherness, or the space of the adversarial, within such a system of “disposal” as I’ve proposed, is never entirely on the outside or implacably oppositional. It is a pressure, and a presence, that acts constantly, if unevenly, along the entire boundary of authorization, that is, on the surface between what I’ve called disposal-as-bestowal and disposition-as-inclination. The contour of difference is agonistic, shifting, splitting, rather like Freud’s description of the system of consciousness which occupies a position in space lying on the borderline between outside and inside, a surface of protection, reception, and projection.\textsuperscript{15} The power play of presence is lost if its transparency is treated naively as the nostalgia for plenitude that should be flung repeatedly into the abyss—\textit{mise en abîme}—from which its desire is born. Such theoretician anarchism cannot intervene in the agonistic space of authority where

the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power [are] attached to the true, it being understood also that it is not a matter of a battle “on behalf” of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays.\textsuperscript{16}

It is precisely to intervene in such a battle for the \textit{status} of the truth that it becomes crucial to examine the \textit{presence} of the English book. For it is this \textit{surface} that stabilizes the agonistic colonial space; it is its \textit{appearance} that regulates the ambivalence between origin and \textit{Entstellung}, discipline and desire, mimesis and repetition.

Despite appearances, the text of transparency inscribes a double vision: the field of the “true” emerges as a visible effect of knowledge/power only after the regulatory and displacing division of the true and the false. From this point of view, discursive “transparency” is best read in the photographic sense in which a transparency is also always a negative, processed into visibility through the technologies of reversal, enlargement, lighting, editing, projection, not a source but a re-source of light. Such a bringing to light is never a prevision; it is always a question of the provision of visibility as a capacity, a strategy, an agency but also in the sense in which the prefix pro(vision) might indicate an elision of sight, delegation, substitution, contiguity, in place of . . . what?

This is the question that brings us to the ambivalence of the presence of authority, peculiarly visible in its colonial articulation. For if transparency signifies discursive closure—intention, image, author—it does so through a disclosure of its \textit{rules of recognition}—those social texts of epistemic, ethnocentric, nationalist intelligibility which cohere in the address of authority as the “present,” the voice of modernity. The acknowledgement of authority depends upon the immediate—unmediated—visibility of its rules of recognition as the unmistakable referent of historical necessity.
In the doubly inscribed space of colonial representation where the presence of authority—the English book—is also a question of its repetition and displacement, where transparency is *technē*, the immediate visibility of such a régime of recognition is resisted. Resistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, nor is it the simple negation or exclusion of the “content” of another culture, as a difference once perceived. It is the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate the signs of cultural difference and reimplicate them within the deferential relations of colonial power—hierarchy, normalization, marginalization, and so forth. For domination is achieved through a process of disavowal that denies the *différence* of colonialisim power—the chaos of its intervention as *Entstellung*, its dislocatory presence—in order to preserve the authority of its identity in the universalist narrative of nineteenth-century historical and political evolutionism.

The exercise of colonialist authority, however, requires the production of differentiations, individuations, identity effects through which discriminatory practices can map out subject populations that are tarred with the visible and transparent mark of power. Such a mode of subjection is distinct from what Foucault describes as “power through transparency”: the reign of opinion, after the late eighteenth century, which could not tolerate areas of darkness and sought to exercise power through the mere fact of things being known and people seen in an immediate, collective gaze. What radically differentiates the exercise of colonial power is the unsuitability of the Enlightenment assumption of collectivity and the eye that beholds it. For Jeremy Bentham (as Michel Perrot points out), the small group is representative of the whole society—the part is *already* the whole. Colonial authority requires modes of discrimination (cultural, racial, administrative . . .) that disallow a stable unitary assumption of collectivity. The “part” (which must be the colonialist foreign body) must be representative of the “whole” (conquered country), but the right of representation is based on its radical difference. Such doublethink is made viable only through the strategy of disavowal just described, which requires a theory of the “hybridization” of discourse and power that is ignored by Western post-structuralists who engage in the battle for “power” as the purists of difference.

The discriminatory effects of the discourse of cultural colonialism, for instance, do not simply or singly refer to a “person,” or to a dialectical power struggle between self and Other, or to a discrimination between mother culture and alien cultures. Produced through the strategy of disavowal, the *reference* of discrimination is always to a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something *different*—a mutation, a hybrid. It is such a partial and double force that is more than the
mimetic but less than the symbolic, that disturbs the visibility of the
colonial presence and makes the recognition of its authority problematic.
To be authoritative, its rules of recognition must reflect consensual
knowledge or opinion; to be powerful, these rules of recognition must
be breached in order to represent the exorbitant objects of discrimination
that lie beyond its purview. Consequently, if the unitary (and essentialist)
reference to race, nation, or cultural tradition is essential to preserve the
presence of authority as an immediate mimetic effect, such essentialism
must be exceeded in the articulation of “differentiatory,” discriminatory
identities.

To demonstrate such an “excess” is not merely to celebrate the joyous
power of the signifier. Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial
power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic
reversal of the process of domination through disavowal (that is, the
production of discriminatory identities that secure the “pure” and original
identity of authority). Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of
colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects.
It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of
discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic
demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies
of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye
of power. For the colonial hybrid is the articulation of the ambivalent
space where the rite of power is enacted on the site of desire, making
its objects at once disciplinary and disseminatory—or, in my mixed met-
aphor, a negative transparency. If discriminatory effects enable the au-
thorities to keep an eye on them, their proliferating difference evade
that eye, escapes that surveillance. Those discriminated against may be
instantly recognized, but they also force a re-cognition of the immediacy
and articulacy of authority—a disturbing effect that is familiar in the
repeated hesitancy afflicting the colonialisist discourse when it contemplates
its discriminated subjects: the inscrutability of the Chinese, the unspeakable
rites of the Indians, the indescribable habits of the Hottentots. It is not
that the voice of authority is at a loss for words. It is, rather, that the
colonial discourse has reached that point when, faced with the hybridity
of its objects, the presence of power is revealed as something other than
what its rules of recognition assert.

If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybrid-
ization rather than the noisy command of colonialisist authority or the
silent repression of native traditions, then an important change of per-
spective occurs. It reveals the ambivalence at the source of traditional
discourses on authority and enables a form of subversion, founded on
that uncertainty, that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into
the grounds of intervention. It is traditional academic wisdom that the
presence of authority is properly established through the nonexercise of
private judgment and the exclusion of reasons, in conflict with the au-
toritative reason. The recognition of authority, however, requires a validation of its source that must be immediately, even intuitively, apparent—"You have that in your countenance which I would fain call master"—and held in common (rules of recognition). What is left unacknowledged is the paradox of such a demand for proof and the resulting ambivalence for positions of authority. If, as Steven Lukes rightly says, the acceptance of authority excludes any evaluation of the content of an utterance, and if its source, which must be acknowledged, disavows both conflicting reasons and personal judgement, then can the "signs" or "marks" of authority be anything more than "empty" presences of strategic devices? Need they be any the less effective because of that? Not less effective but effective in a different form, would be our answer.

Tom Nairn reveals a basic ambivalence between the symbols of English imperialism which could not help "looking universal" and a "hollowness [that] sounds through the English imperialist mind in a thousand forms: in Rider Haggard's necrophilia, in Kipling's moments of gloomy doubt, . . . in the gloomy cosmic truth of Forster's Marabar caves." Nairn explains this "imperial delirium" as the disproportion between the grandiose rhetoric of English imperialism and the real economic and political situation of late Victorian England. I would like to suggest that these crucial moments in English literature are not simply crises of England's own making. They are also the signs of a discontinuous history, an estrangement of the English book. They mark the disturbance of its authoritative representations by the uncanny forces of race, sexuality, violence, cultural and even climatic differences which emerge in the colonial discourse as the mixed and split texts of hybridity. If the appearance of the English book is read as a production of colonial hybridity, then it no longer simply commands authority. It gives rise to a series of questions of authority that, in my bastardized repetition, must sound strangely familiar:

Was it a badge—an ornament—a charm—a propitiatory act? Was there any idea at all connected with it? It looked startling in this black neck of the woods, this bit of white writing from beyond the seas.

In repeating the scenario of the English book, I hope I have succeeded in representing a colonial difference: it is the effect of uncertainty that afflicts the discourse of power, an uncertainty that estranges the familiar symbol of English "national" authority and emerges from its colonial appropriation as the sign of its difference. Hybridity is the name of this displacement of value from symbol to sign that causes the dominant discourse to split along the axis of its power to be representative, authoritative. Hybridity represents that ambivalent "turn" of the discriminated subject into the terrifying, exorbitant object of paranoid classification—a disturbing questioning of the images and presences of authority. To
grasp the ambivalence of hybridity, it must be distinguished from an inversion that would suggest that the originary is, really, only the "effect" of an Entstellung. Hybridity has no such perspective of depth or truth to provide: it is not a third term that resolves the tension between two cultures, or the two scenes of the book, in a dialectical play of "recognition." The displacement from symbol to sign creates a crisis for any concept of authority based on a system of recognition: colonial specularity, doubly inscribed, does not produce a mirror where the self apprehends itself; it is always the split screen of the self and its doubling, the hybrid.

These metaphors are very much to the point, because they suggest that colonial hybridity is not a problem of genealogy or identity between two different cultures which can then be resolved as an issue of cultural relativism. Hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other "denied" knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority—its rules of recognition. Again, it must be stressed, it is not simply the content of disavowed knowledges—be they forms of cultural Otherness or traditions of colonialist treachery—that return to be acknowledged as counterauthorities. For the resolution of conflicts between authorities, civil discourse always maintains an adjudicative procedure. What is irredeemably estranging in the presence of the hybrid—in the revaluation of the symbol of national authority as the sign of colonial difference—is that the difference of cultures can no longer be identified or evaluated as objects of epistemological or moral contemplation: they are not simply there to be seen or appropriated.

Hybridity reverses the formal process of disavowal so that the violent dislocation, the Entstellung of the act of colonization becomes the conditionality of colonial discourse. The presence of colonialist authority is no longer immediately visible; its discriminatory identifications no longer have their authoritative reference to this culture's cannibalism or that people's perfidy. As an articulation of displacement and dislocation, it is now possible to identify "the cultural" as a disposal of power, a negative transparency that comes to be agonistically constructed on the boundary between frame of reference/frame of mind. It is crucial to remember that the colonial construction of the cultural (the site of the civilizing mission) through the process of disavowal is authoritative to the extent to which it is structured around the ambivalence of splitting, denial, repetition—strategies of defence that mobilize culture as an open-textured, warlike strategy whose aim "is rather a continued agony than a total disappearance of the pre-existing culture." To see the cultural not as the source of conflict—different cultures—but as the effect of discriminatory practices—the production of cultural differentiation as signs of authority—changes its value and its rules of recognition. What is preserved is the visible surfaces of its artefacts—the mere visibility of the symbol, as a fleeting immediacy. Hybridity intervenes in the exercise of authority not
merely to indicate the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of its presence. The book retains its presence, but it is no longer a representation of an essence; it is now a partial presence, a (strategic) device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority.

This partializing process of hybridity is best described as a metonymy of presence. It shares Sigmund Freud’s valuable insight into the strategy of disavowal as the persistence of the narcissistic demand in the acknowledgment of difference. This, however, exacts a price, for the existence of two contradictory knowledges (multiple beliefs) splits the ego (or the discourse) into two psychical attitudes, and forms of knowledge, toward the external world. The first of these takes reality into consideration while the second replaces it with a product of desire. What is remarkable is that these two contradictory objectives always represent a “partiality” in the construction of the fetish object, at once a substitute for the phallus and a mark of its absence. There is an important difference between fetishism and hybridity. The fetish reacts to the change in the value of the phallus by fixing on an object prior to the perception of difference, an object that can metaphorically substitute for its presence while registering the difference. So long as it fulfills the fetishistic ritual, the object can look like anything (or nothing!). The hybrid object, however, retains the actual semblance of the authoritative symbol but revalues its presence by resiting it as the signifier of Entstellung—after the intervention of difference. It is the power of this strange metonymy of presence to so disturb the systematic (and systemic) construction of discriminatory knowledges that the cultural, once recognized as the medium of authority, becomes virtually unrecognizable. Culture, as a colonial space of intervention and agonism, as the trace of the displacement of symbol to sign, can be transformed by the unpredictable and partial desire of hybridity. Deprived of their full presence, the knowledges of cultural authority may be articulated with forms of “native” knowledges or faced with those discriminated subjects that they must rule but can no longer represent. This may lead, as in the case of the natives outside Delhi, to questions of authority that the authorities—the Bible included—cannot answer. Such a process is not the deconstruction of a cultural system from the margins of its own aporia nor, as in Derrida’s “Double Session,” the mime that haunts mimesis. The display of hybridity—its peculiar “replication”—terrorizes authority with the ruse of recognition, its mimicry, its mockery.

Such a reading of colonial authority profoundly unsettles the demand that figures at the centre of the originary myth of colonialist power. It is the demand that the space it occupies be unbounded, its reality coincident with the emergence of an imperialist narrative and history, its discourse nondiallogic, its enunciation unitary, unmarked by the trace of difference—a demand that is recognizable in a range of justificatory Western “civil” discourses where the presence of the “colony” often alienates its own
language of liberty and reveals its universalist concepts of labour and property as particular, post-Enlightenment ideological and technological practices. Consider, for example: Locke's notion of the wasteland of Carolina—"Thus in the beginning all the World was America"; Montesquieu's emblem of the wasteful and disorderly life and labour in despotic societies—"When the savages of Louisiana are desirous of fruit, they cut the tree to the root, and gather the fruit"; Grant's belief in the impossibility of law and history in Muslim and Hindu India—"where treasons and revolutions are continual; by which the insolent and abject frequently change places"; or the contemporary Zionist myth of the neglect of Palestine—"of a whole territory," Said writes, "essentially unused, unappreciated, misunderstood . . . to be made useful, appreciated, understandable."

What renders this demand of colonial power impossible is precisely the point at which the question of authority emerges. For the unitary voice of command is interrupted by questions that arise from these heterogeneous sites and circuits of power which, though momentarily "fixed" in the authoritative alignment of subjects, must continually be re-presented in the production of terror or fear—the paranoid threat from the hybrid is finally uncontainable because it breaks down the symmetry and duality of self/Other, inside/outside. In the productivity of power, the boundaries of authority—its reality effects—are always besieged by "the other scene" of fixations and phantoms. We can now understand the link between the psychic and political that is suggested in Frantz Fanon's figure of speech: the colon is an exhibitionist, because his preoccupation with security makes him "remind the native out loud that there he alone is master." The native, caught in the chains of colonialist command, achieves a "pseudopetrification" which further incites and excites him, thus making the settler-native boundary an anxious and ambivalent one. What then presents itself as the subject of authority in the discourse of colonial power is, in fact, a desire that so exceeds the original authority of the book and the immediate visibility of its metaphoric writing that we are bound to ask: What does colonial power want? My answer is only partially in agreement with Lacan's vel or Derrida's veil or hymen. For the desire of colonial discourse is a splitting of hybridity that is less than one and double; and if that sounds enigmatic, it is because its explanation has to wait upon the authority of those canny questions that the natives put, so insistently, to the English book.

The native questions quite literally turn the origin of the book into an enigma. First: How can the word of God come from the flesh-eating mouths of the English?—a question that faces the unitary and universalist assumption of authority with the cultural difference of its historical moment of enunciation. And later: How can it be the European Book, when we believe that it is God's gift to us? He sent it to Hurdwar. This is not merely an illustration of what Foucault would call the capillary effects of the microtechnics of power. It reveals the penetrative power—both psychic and social—of the
technology of the printed word in early nineteenth-century rural India. Imagine the scene: the Bible, perhaps translated into a North Indian dialect like Brighbasha, handed out free or for one rupee within a culture where usually only caste Hindus would possess a copy of the Scriptures, and received in awe by the natives as both a novelty and a household deity. Contemporary missionary records reveal that, in Middle India alone, by 1815 we could have witnessed the spectacle of the Gospel “doing its own work,” as the Evangelicals put it, in at least eight languages and dialects, with a first edition of between one thousand and ten thousand copies in each translation (see MR, May 1816, pp. 181–82). It is the force of these colonialist practices that produce that discursive tension between Anund Messeh, whose address assumes its authority, and the natives who question the English presence and seek a culturally differentiated, “colonial” authority to address.

The subversive character of the native questions will be realized only once we recognize the strategic disavowal of cultural/historical difference in Anund Messeh’s Evangelical discourse. Having introduced the presence of the English and their intercession—“God gave [the Book] long ago to the Sahibs, and THEY sent it to us”—he then disavows that political/linguistic “imposition” by attributing the intervention of the Church to the power of God and the received authority of chapter and verse. What is being disavowed is not entirely visible in Anund Messeh’s contradictory statements, at the level of the “enounced.” What he, as well as the English Bible-in-disguise must conceal are their particular enunciatory conditions—that is, the design of the Burdwan Plan to deploy “natives” to destroy native culture and religion. This is done through the repeated production of a teleological narrative of Evangelical witness: eager conversions, bereft Brahmins, and Christian gatherings. The descent from God to the English is both linear and circular: “This WORD is of God, and not of men; and when HE makes your hearts to understand, then you will PROPERLY comprehend.” The historical “evidence” of Christianity is plain for all to see, Indian Evangelists would have argued, with the help of William Paley’s *Evidences of Christianity* (1791), the most important missionary manual throughout the nineteenth century. The miraculous authority of colonial Christianity, they would have held, lies precisely in its being both English and universal, empirical and uncanny, for “ought we not rather to expect that such a Being on occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed?” The Word, no less theocratic than logocentric, would have certainly borne absolute witness to the gospel of Hurdwar had it not been for the rather tasteless fact that most Hindus were vegetarian!

By taking their stand on the grounds of dietary law, the natives resist the miraculous equivalence of God and the English. They introduce the practice of colonial cultural differentiation as an indispensable enunciative function in the discourse of authority—a function Foucault describes as
linked to "a 'referential' that . . . forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation." Through the natives' strange questions, it is possible to see, with historical hindsight, what they resisted in questioning the presence of the English—as religious mediation and as a cultural and linguistic medium. What is the value of English in the offering of the Hindi Bible? It is the creation of a print technology calculated to produce a visual effect that will not "look like the work of foreigners"; it is the decision to produce simple, abridged tracts of the plainest narrative that may inculcate the habit of "private, solitary reading," as a missionary wrote in 1816, so that the natives may resist the Brahmin's "monopoly of knowledge" and lessen their dependence on their own religious and cultural traditions; it is the opinion of the Reverend Donald Corrie that "on learning English they acquire ideas quite new, and of the first importance, respecting God and his government" (MR, July 1816, p. 193; Nov. 1816, pp. 444–45; Mar. 1816, pp. 106–7). It is the shrewd view of an unknown native, in 1819:

For instance, I take a book of yours and read it awhile and whether I become a Christian or not, I leave the book in my family: after my death, my son, conceiving that I would leave nothing useless or bad in my house, will look into the book, understand its contents, consider that his father left him that book, and become a Christian. [MR, Jan. 1819, p. 27]

When the natives demand an Indianized Gospel, they are using the powers of hybridity to resist baptism and to put the project of conversion in an impossible position. Any adaptation of the Bible was forbidden by the evidences of Christianity, for, as the bishop of Calcutta preached in his Christmas sermon in 1815: "I mean that it is a Historical Religion: the History of the whole dispensation is before us from the creation of the world to the present hour: and it is throughout consistent with itself and with the attributes of God (MR, Jan. 1817, p. 31). Their stipulation that only mass conversion would persuade them to take the sacrament touches on a tension between missionary zeal and the East India Company Statutes for 1814 which strongly advised against such proselytizing. When they make these intercultural, hybrid demands, the natives are both challenging the boundaries of discourse and subtly changing its terms by setting up another specifically colonial space of power/knowledge. And they do this under the eye of authority, through the production of "partial" knowledges and positionalities in keeping with my earlier, more general explanation of hybridity. Such objects of knowledges make the signifiers of authority enigmatic in a way that is "less than one and double." They change their conditions of recognition while maintaining
their visibility; they introduce a lack that is then represented as a doubling or mimicry. This mode of discursive disturbance is a sharp practice, rather like that of the perfidious barbers in the bazaars of Bombay who do not mug their customers with the blunt Lacanian vel “Your money or your life,” leaving them with nothing. No, these wily oriental thieves, with far greater skill, pick their clients’ pockets and cry out, “How the master’s face shines!” and then, in a whisper, “But he’s lost his mettle!” And this traveler’s tale, told by a native, is an emblem of that form of splitting—less than one and double—that I have suggested for the reading of the ambivalence of colonial cultural texts. In estranging the word of God from the English medium, the natives’ questions dispense the logical order of the discourse of authority—“These books . . . teach the religion of the European Sahibs. It is THEIR Book; and they printed it in our language, for our use.” The natives expel the copula, or middle term, of the Evangelical “power = knowledge” equation, which then disarticulates the structure of the God-Englishman equivalence. Such a crisis in the positionality and propositionality of colonialist authority destabilizes the sign of authority. For by alienating “English” as the middle term, the presence of authority is freed of a range of ideological correlates—for instance, intentionality, originality, authenticity, cultural normativity. The Bible is now ready for a specific colonial appropriation. On the one hand, its paradigmatic presence as the Word of God is assiduously preserved: it is only to the direct quotations from the Bible that the natives give their unquestioning approval—“True!” The expulsion of the copula, however, empties the presence of its syntagmatic supports—codes, connotations, and cultural associations that give it contiguity and continuity—that make its presence culturally and politically authoritative.

In this sense, then, it may be said that the presence of the book has acceded to the logic of the signifier and has been “separated,” in Lacan’s use of the term, from “itself.” If, on one side, its authority, or some symbol or meaning of it, is maintained—willy-nilly, less than one—then, on the other, it fades. It is at the point of its fading that the signifier of presence gets caught up in an alienating strategy of doubling or repetition. Doubling repeats the fixed and empty presence of authority by articulating it syntagmatically with a range of differential knowledges and positionalities that both estrange its “identity” and produce new forms of knowledge, new modes of differentiation, new sites of power. In the case of the colonial discourse, these syntagmatic appropriations of presence confront it with those contradictory and threatening differences of its enunciative function that had been disavowed. In their repetition, these disavowed knowledges return to make the presence of authority uncertain. This may take the form of multiple or contradictory belief, as in some forms of native knowledges: “We are willing to be baptized, but we will never take the Sacrament.” Or they may be forms of mythic explanation that refuse to acknowledge the agency of the Evangelicals: “An Angel from
heaven gave it [the Bible] us at Hurdwar fair." Or they may be the fetishistic repetition of litany in the face of an unanswerable challenge to authority: for instance, Anund Messeh’s “Not that which entereth into a man’s mouth defileth him, but that which cometh out of the mouth.”

In each of these cases we see a colonial doubling which I’ve described as a strategic displacement of value through a process of the metonymy of presence. It is through this partial process, represented in its enigmatic, inappropriate signifiers—stereotypes, jokes, multiple and contradictory belief, the “native” Bible—that we begin to get a sense of a specific space of cultural colonial discourse. It is a “separate” space, a space of separation—less than one and double—which has been systematically denied by both colonialists and nationalists who have sought authority in the authenticity of “origins.” It is precisely as a separation from origins and essences that this colonial space is constructed. It is separate, in the sense in which the French psychoanalyst Victor Smirnoff describes the separateness of the fetish as a “separateness that makes the fetish easily available, so that the subject can make use of it in his own way and establish it in an order of things that frees it from any subordination.”

The metonymic strategy produces the signifier of colonial mimicry as the affect of hybridity—at once a mode of appropriation and of resistance, from the disciplined to the desiring. As the discriminated object, the metonym of presence becomes the support of an authoritarian voyeurism, all the better to exhibit the eye of power. Then, as discrimination turns into the assertion of the hybrid, the insignia of authority becomes a mask, a mockery. After our experience of the native interrogation, it is difficult to agree entirely with Fanon that the psychic choice is to “turn white or disappear.” There is the more ambivalent, third choice: camouflage, mimicry, black skins/white masks. “Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry,” writes Lacan, “is camouflage, in the strictly technical sense. It is not a question of harmonizing with the background but, against a mottled background, of being mottled—exactly like the technique of camouflage practised in human warfare.”

Read as a masque of mimicry, Anund Messeh’s tale emerges as a question of colonial authority, an agonistic space. To the extent to which discourse is a form of defensive warfare, mimicry marks those moments of civil disobedience within the discipline of civility: signs of spectacular resistance. When the words of the master become the site of hybridity—the warlike sign of the native—then we may not only read between the lines but even seek to change the often coercive reality that they so lucidly contain. It is with the strange sense of a hybrid history that I want to end.

Despite Anund Messeh’s miraculous evidence, “native Christians were never more than vain phantoms” as J. A. Dubois wrote in 1815, after
twenty-five years in Madras. Their parlous partial state caused him particular anxiety,

for in embracing the Christian religion they never entirely renounce their superstitions towards which they always keep a secret bent . . . there is no unfeigned, undisguised Christian among these Indians. [MR, Nov. 1816, p. 212]

And what of the native discourse? Who can tell? The Reverend Mr. Corrie, the most eminent of the Indian evangelists, warned that

till they came under the English Government, they have not been accustomed to assert the nose upon their face their own. . . . This temper prevails, more or less, in the converted. [MR, Mar. 1816, pp. 106–7]

Archdeacon Potts, in handing over charge to the Reverend J. P. Sper- schneider in July 1818, was a good deal more worried:

If you urge them with their gross and unworthy misconceptions of the nature and will of God or the monstrous follies of their fabulous theology, they will turn it off with a sly civility perhaps, or with a popular and careless proverb. [MR, Sept. 1818, p. 375]

Was it in the spirit of such sly civility that the native Christians parried so long with Anund Messeh and then, at the mention of baptism, politely excused themselves: “Now we must go home to the harvest. . . . perhaps the next year we may come to Meerut.”

And what is the significance of the Bible? Who knows? Three years before the native Christians received the Bible at Hurdwar, a schoolmaster named Sandappan wrote from southern India, asking for a Bible:

Rev. Fr. Have mercy upon me. I am amongst so many craving beggars for the Holy Scriptures the chief craving beggar. The bounty of the bestowers of this treasure is so great I understand, that even this book is read in rice and salt-markets. [MR, June 1813, pp. 221–22]

But, in the same year—1817—as the miracle outside Delhi, a much-tried missionary wrote in some considerable rage:

Still everyone would gladly receive a Bible. And why? That he may store it up as a curiosity; sell it for a few pice; or use it for waste
paper. . . . Some have been bartered in the markets. . . . If these remarks are at all warranted then an indiscriminate distribution of the scriptures, to everyone who may say he wants a Bible, can be little less than a waste of time, a waste of money and a waste of expectations. For while the public are hearing of so many Bibles distributed, they expect to hear soon of a correspondent number of conversions. [MR, May 1817, p. 186]

1. Missionary Register, Church Missionary Society, London, Jan. 1818, pp. 18–19; all further references to this work, abbreviated MR, will be included in the text, with dates and page numbers in parentheses.


4. “Overall effect of the dream-work: the latent thoughts are transformed into a manifest formation in which they are not easily recognisable. They are not only transposed, as it were, into another key, but they are also distorted in such a fashion that only an effort of interpretation can reconstitute them” (J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [London, 1980], p. 124; my emphasis). See also Samuel Weber’s excellent chapter “Metapsychology Set Apart,” The Legend of Freud (Minneapolis, 1982), pp. 32–60.

5. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, 1981), pp. 189–90; all further references to this work, abbreviated D, will be included in the text.


You have printed the following article:

Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817
Homi K. Bhabha
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0093-1896%28198523%2912%3A1%3C144%3ASTFWQO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes]

8 The Background of Macaulay's Minute
Elmer H. Cutts
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762%28195307%2958%3A4%3C824%3ATBOMM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.